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WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1957
action." This is the latest example of that perennial distrust of party
testimony and of the jury which has appeared so often in statute and
decision; in fact the reason assigned as justification for the original
Guest Statute was that it would tend to prevent perjurious collusion
between host and guest to the ruin of insurers. That the notion also
reflects upon the bar is perhaps beside the point, and in any event it is
likely that one who dwells in the groves of Academe should not ques-
tion it. It will be the rare case in which, in some fashion, the require-
ment cannot be met, and it is almost a certainty that it will not be
applied to those cases where the plaintiff's theory is that he was not
a guest at all.
JOHN W. RIcHARDs
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
The 1957 Legislature passed two bills, H.B. 267 (Chapter 70) and
H.B. 617 (Chapter 196), which effected significant changes in the
industrial insurance laws of the state of Washington. The most im-
portant of these changes are described and discussed below.
Action Against Persons Whose Negligence Caused Compensable
Injury or Disease. A basic quid pro quo underlies all workmen's com-
pensation statutes. The employer makes substantial concessions as
the price of his limited, but absolute, liability. In exchange, the em-
ployee gives up some of his rights to bring damage suits for injuries he
has sustained.1
The Washington statute is no exception. RCW 51.04.010 provides:
All phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy
* . .sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in extra-hazardous
work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided ... to the
exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except
as otherwise provided in this Act . . . to that end all civil actions and
all civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction
of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except
as in this Act provided.2
But all workmen's compensation statutes recognize that where the
negligence of a "stranger" or a "third person" was the cause of com-
SLarson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 71.20 (1952).
2RCW 51.32.010 provides: "Each workman ... or his family or dependents...
shall receive compensation ... and, except as in this title otherwise provided, such pay-
ment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any person
whomsoever..."
3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72 (1952).
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pensable injury to a workman in the course of employment, the
"stranger" or "third person" should not be absolved of his obligation to
pay the usual amount of damages for such injury.
The statutes of the several states vary, however, on the question of
who is a "stranger" or a "third person." In most jurisdictions the
"stranger" or "third person" against whom negligence actions may be
brought for compensable industrial injuries includes all persons other
than the injured person's own employer. Co-employees, employers of
employees working on the same project, and physicians whose malprac-
tice aggravates the compensable injury may be reached in a damage
action.'
The Washington statute has never defined the term this broadly,
although from 1911 to 1927 it permitted a negligence action against
a person "not in the same employ" provided that the injury occurred
to the workman away from the plant of his employer; and from 1927
to 1929 it permitted a negligence action against such persons even
though the workman sustained the injury in the plant of his employer.'
However, since 1929 the Washington Act has excluded from the
concept of the "third person" against whom the workman may bring
a negligence action "any employer or any workman under the Act...
if at the time of the accident such employer or such workman was in
the course of any extra-hazardous employment under this Act."5 Thus,
Washington has been one of the three states (the others being Alabama
and Illinois) that have undertaken to immunize from a negligence
action the "entire membership of the state's compensation family."
'
Indeed, the Washington Act has extended the immunity further than
the acts of the other two states.'
There has been considerable dissatisfaction in some quarters with
the "exclusive remedy" principle of workmen's compensation law, even
in those states where the injured worker loses only his cause of action
against his own employer. This dissatisfaction has sprung largely from
the inadequacy of benefits available under workmen's compensation
laws. Those benefits are not only rigidly limited by statute, but they
also fail to provide compensation for some items of loss, e.g., facial
disfigurement. Thus, the argument has been made that the employee
'See Holmes, Actions Against Persons Whose Negligence Caused Compensable
Injury or Disease, p. 2 (unpublished manuscript, School of Law, University of Wash-
ington, 1957).
5 RCW 5124.010 (proviso).




has, under workmen's compensation laws, given up more than he has
received; that he has been the victim of a bad bargain.8
The point is illustrated by the recent Washington decision in Hand
v. Greyhound Corp.' In that case, the workman suffered severe facial
burns, which are not compensable under the Washington statute. Non-
theless, he was barred from bringing a negligence action against the
defendant, who was not his employer, because it was engaged in extra-
hazardous work at the time of the injury.
Perhaps in part because of the impetus provided by the Hand case,
the 1957 Legislature amended RCW 51.24.010 by eliminating the pro-
viso immunizing from a negligence action an "employer or ... work-
man... [who] at the time of the accident... was in the course of...
extra-hazardous employment."
The deletion of the proviso does not, however, give the injured work-
man or his dependent the choice of either bringing a damage action or
claiming under the statute in every case where the injury was caused
by the negligence or wrong of another. This is so because the cause of
action provided by RCW 51.24.010 does not arise except where the
injury was "due to negligence or wrong of another not in the same
employ." [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, it is clear that persons in the same employ as the injured work-
man are still immune from a damage action. Morever, since the injured
workman has no cause of action against a co-employee, it also seems
plain that he has no cause of action, on the theory of respondeat supe-
rior, against his employer. Certainly it would be anomalous to immu-
nize the co-employe who is the actual tortfeasor while permitting an
action against the faultless employer.
The workmen's compensation statutes of most states immunize the
injured workman's employer but permit him to sue his negligent co-
workers.10 But there are no state statutes that immunize the negligent
co-employee while making the employer liable."
Thus, in the usual situation, the injured workman's employer will
remain free from a damage action under the Washington Act. There
are situations, however, that will pose difficulties.
Suppose, for example, the workman is employed by a public utility
8 Sommers & Sommers, Workmen's Compensation, 191 (1954).
0 149 Wash. Dec. 129, 299 P.2d 554 (1956).
10 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72.10 (1952).
11 A number of states, among them Alabama, Colorado, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Utah, extend the immunity to the injured workman's co-employees as well
as to his employer. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72.20 (1952).
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company and is permanently injured by contact with a high voltage
wire negligently located and maintained by his corporate employer.
May he sue his employer under RCW 51.24.010 on the ground that his
injury was "due to the negligence.., of another not in the same em-
ploy?" [Emphasis supplied] The Washington Court permitted an em-
ployee to recover against his own employer under the old statute where
the latter had defaulted on his obligation to report the payroll and pay
premiums. 2 However, the point under discussion here was not raised
as a defense.
To pose other troublesome situations, suppose that the tortfeasor
was the president of the workman's corporate employer. Such an offi-
cer is a "workman" under the Act while doing extra-hazardous work,
and is subject to its disabilities even though he has not qualified for
its benefits.13
Or suppose that the plaintiff's tortfeasor-employer was also a self-
employed employee-viz., a working employer. Such a person is not
a "workman" under the statute, is not subject to its disabilities until
he has qualified for its benefits,' but is covered by its immunities."
It is a good guess that the Court will extend the immunity to these
and similar situations on the theory that the employer (corporate, indi-
vidual enterpreneur, or otherwise) who is in compliance with the statute
has, in exchange for subjecting himself to a limited, but absolute, lia-
bility, acquired an immunity at least as to the persons on whose behalf
he is paying premiums.
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the cause of action created
by RCW 51.24.010 is an exception to the general policy of the statute,
which extinguishes all rights of action, and, as such, has been given a
narrow construction.16
Another question which may produce some difficulty is whether the
workman has a cause of action when his injury is caused by the negli-
gence of a person who is in the same employ but who, at the time of
injury, was not acting in the course of his employment. The cases under
the old RCW 51.24.010 holding that an employer or workman is not
immune to a damage action unless he was engaged in extra-hazardous
work at the time of the injury to the plaintiff,"' suggest an affirmative
12 Long v. Thompson, 177 Wash. 296, 31 P.2d 908 (1934).
13 Koresd v. Seattle Hardware Co., 17 Wn2d 421, 135 P.2d 860 (1943).
14Latimer v. Western Machinery, 42 Wn.2d 756, 259 P.2d 623 (1953); Pink v.
Rayonier, 42 Wn.2d 768, 259 P2d 629 (1953).
15 Jewett v. Kerwood, 43 Wn.2d 691, 263 P.2d 830 (1953).
16 See Koreski v. Seattle Hardware Co., 17 Wn.2d 421, 135 P.2d 860 (1943).
17 Peters v. Snohomish County, 46 Wn.2d 192, 279 P2d 1085 (1955).
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answer. However, the analogy is weakened, if not destroyed, by the
fact that the proviso to the old statute made it plain that the immunity
did not operate unless, "at the time of the accident, such employer
or... workman was in the course of... extra-hazardous employment."
Other questions involving the meaning of the phrase "another not
in the same employ" will doubtless arise. For example, suppose the
injured employee (plaintiff) was working for subcontractor A, and the
negligent employee (defendant) was working for subcontractor B on
the same project. Since, under RCW 51.12.070, the person, firm, or
corporation who lets a contract is primarily responsible to the state
for all compensation premiums for workers employed on the job, and
the general contractor is primarily responsible for reimbursement of
the person letting the contract, with a right of proportionate indemnity
from each subcontractor, it may be argued that, in a statutory sense,
the injured workman and the negligent workman were in the "same
employ."
The 1957 Legislature made two other changes in RCW 51.24.010
which are noteworthy. Where the claimant who has a damage action
against a third party elects to seek compensation under the Act, his
cause of action is assigned to the state for the benefit of the Accident
Fund and the Medical Aid Fund. Previously the Department was
empowered to prosecute or compromise the cause of action in its dis-
cretion. Under the 1957 Amendments the "cause of action . . . may
be prosecuted or compromised by the Department in its discretion in
the name of the workman, beneficiaries, or legal representatives."
[Emphasis supplied.]
Where the workman makes the other choice, that is, brings a damage
action, he may, by virtue of the 1957 amendments, "receive benefits
payable under this title as if such election had not been made." To the
extent that the Department makes such payments to the injured work-
man or his dependents, it is subrogated to his rights "against the recov-
ery had from such third party and shall have a lien thereupon."
Prior to this change the injured workman could not recover defi-
ciency compensation under the statute until he was in a position to
make proofs as to the amount of money "actually collected" from the
third person.
Benefits Payable Under the Statute. The 1957 legislature sub-
stantially increased the schedule of benefits available under the Act.
Lump sum and monthly pension and compensation payments avail-
19571
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able under the new schedule have been raised in amounts ranging
from 25% to 100% over the payments available under the old sched-
ule. In addition, the following changes were made:
1. A totally and permanently disabled female worker with
husband will now be compensated at the same rate as a married
man. Prior to the 1957 amendments this was true only when the
husband was an invalid.
2. Prior to the 1957 amendments a workman received no com-
pensation for the day of injury and for the three days immediately
following. Hereafter this restriction shall not operate if the dis-
ability continues for a period of thirty consecutive calendar days
from the date of injury.
3. The legislature amended the statute which permits conver-
sion of monthly payments in death and disability cases to a lump
sum payment (RCW 51.32.130) by raising the maximum lump
sum payment which may be made from $5000 to $8500.
Standing to Appeal Decisions of the Board of Industrial Insurance
Appeals. Prior to the 1957 Amendments, RCW 51.52.110 provided
that a workman, beneficiary, employer or other person aggrieved by
the decision and order of the Board might appeal to the superior court.
The 1957 legislature added a proviso reading as follows:
That whenever the Board has made any decision and order reversing
an order of the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance on questions of law
or mandatory administrative actions of the director, the Department
of Labor and Industries shall have the right of appeal to the superior
court. [Emphasis supplied.]
The amendment was apparently intended to overcome the effect of
the decision in Department v. Cook.18
DONALD H. WOLLETT
18 44 Wn2d 671, 269 P2d 962 (1954).
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